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INTRODUCTION
International issues have always posed significant problems for U.S.
copyright law. Many of these issues were resolved when the United States
acceded to the Berne Convention' in 1988. However, one needs to look no
further than the burgeoning trade conflict with China to see that major
challenges in the area of international copyright still remain. On February
4, 1995, the United States decided to slap China with the largest trade
sanctions in U.S. history, with tariffs of up to 100 percent on $1.08 billion
worth of Chinese imports.2 The reason for the stiff measures is the failure
of the Chinese government to shut down factories which vigorously pirate
U.S. goods. Such unauthorized copying has cost U.S. companies more than
a billion dollars in lost revenues over the previous year.3
While protecting U.S. manufacturers from overseas pirating can be
extremely difficult without an enforceable bilateral copyright agreement, a
recent decision from the Ninth Circuit may make enforcement even more
troublesome. The decision of the Ninth Circuit in Subafilms, Ltd. v.
MGM-Pathe Communications Co.4 ended several years of debate over the
extraterritorial application of the U.S. Copyright Act.' With the United
States now in the midst of controversy over the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 6 the issues raised by Subafilms are particularly
relevant. While the United States continues to lose billions of dollars per
year to acts of piracy abroad, the Ninth Circuit, by ruling that the U.S.
Copyright Act is not effective abroad, has issued a wake up call to
Congress. The responsibility lies with Congress to tailor the Copyright Act
for extraterritorial application by making a few modest revisions.
This Note briefly examines the history of U.S. copyright law with
regard to the international community and will discuss the theories of
vicarious and contributory liability and their common origin in the law of
torts. This Note then discusses chronologically the copyright cases
1. Beme Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24, 1971,
S. Treaty Doc. 99-27, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 37 (1986) 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Beme
Convention].
2. Martha M. Hamilton, U.S. to Hit China With Stiff Tariffs, WASH. POST, Feb. 5,
1995, at Al.
3. Id. atA31.
4. Subafilms, 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 512 (1994).
5. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-803).
6. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, TIAS No. 170, 50
U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
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involving extraterritorial application of the Copyright Act. This Note
concludes by critiquing the Subafilms decision and proposing some changes
to the Copyright Act. These changes are in line with the current direction
of U.S. copyright law in the international arena and are consistent with
existing doctrines of vicarious and contributory infringement.
The Subafilms decision, although flawed, highlights a loophole of
sorts in U.S. copyright law which, if not addressed, could have potentially
devastating effects. This Note does not argue for intervention in the affairs
of other sovereign states. It merely calls for changes in the existing
copyright law to allow the U.S. government to prosecute would-be pirates
who seek to circumvent the law by carrying out their activities abroad. As
a nation, we cannot bemoan the lack of protection afforded U.S. works by
foreign governments, while excusing illicit activities sanctioned by our own
companies.
I. THE UNITED STATES JoiNs THE BERNE CONVENTION
A. United States Copyright Law Before 1976
For most of its first two hundred years of existence, the copyright law
of the United States7 was replete with archaic' requirements and formali-
ties, including those of recording, notice, and deposit found in the
Copyright Acts of 1790 and 1909.10 Non-U.S. nationals were denied the
protection of U.S. copyright law until 1891.11 Even with the passage of
7. United States intellectual property law springs from the Constitution. "To promote
the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 8.
8. I use the term archaic because the United States drew heavily upon the Statute of
Anne, passed in 1710 and known as the first copyright statute, for most of its provisions
including notice, registration, and deposit. Most nations dropped these provisions during the
latter half of the nineteenth century, but they remained a part of U.S. copyright law until
1986. See ALAN LATMAN ET AL., COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES 5-7 (3d ed. 1989).
9. Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, repealed by Act of Feb. 3,
1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436.
10. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, repealed by The Copyright Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-803).
11. The reason for this is probably because the young United States felt the need to
.encourage learning" and develop its own culture "by granting incentives to American
authors," while pardoning piracy of foreign works. Witness the statement of Sidney Smith
in 1820, "[No one] in the four quarters of the globe . . . reads an American book."
LATMAN, supra note 8, at 7-8 (quoting United Dictionary Co. v. Merriam Co., 208 U.S.
260, 264 (1908)). See also 3 DAvID NIMMER & MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 17.01[C][1][a] (1995). "During that century foreigners were utterly without
rights under U.S. copyright law, and American publishers busied themselves bootlegging
the works of Dickens, Trollope, Hugo, et al." Id. Of course, this also adversely affected
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the 1891 International Copyright Act, 2 foreigners seeking the protection
of U.S. copyright law had to comply with the cumbersome requirements
of recording, notice, and deposit and were forced to contract with an
American business for the manufacture of any book or other work. 3 It
was apparent that the name "International" in the 1891 Copyright Act was
a misnomer belying ulterior, protectionist motives.1 4
While the copyright law of the United States possessed an isolationist
perspective, some European nations began to move toward the adoption of
multinational copyright standards. In 1886, a convention took place in
Berne, Switzerland that spawned the Berne Convention for the Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention or Convention) and an
international copyright union." The Convention was the result of "over
25 years of study and conferences which were undertaken by representa-
tives of authors and artists ... acting to replace the growing patchwork of
European bilateral copyright arrangements with a simple, multilateral treaty
respecting authors' rights."16
The Berne Convention established "two cardinal principals, both of
continuing vitality today."17 First, it established the formation of an
International Copyright Union whose members would function as "a
cooperative unit" with a perpetual existence unaffected by any future
"accessions or withdrawals." 8 Second, the Convention established the
principle of "national treatment," giving foreign authors and artists the
same protection for their creations that native authors and artists enjoy, and
set minimum standards-baseline copyright protection all nations must
provide to Convention claimants. 9 In order to gain protection, the work
first had to be recorded in a Union nation before the work was published
in a nation that had not acceded to the Convention.20 The United States,
American writers who now had to compete with very inexpensive copies of the works of
their European counterparts. Id.
12. The International Copyright Act of 1891 (Chace Act), ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1106,
repealed by Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075.
13. LATMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 7.
14. Id.
15. H.R. REP. No. 609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-66 (1988), reprinted in PAUL
GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE, app. 503 (Supp. 1994). See
also NIMMER, supra note 11, at § 17.01[B][1]. The Convention has been revised at
subsequent meetings of its member nations in Paris (1896), Rome (1928), Brussels (1948),
Stockholm (1967), and Paris (1971). H.R. REP. No. 609, at 503.
16. H.R. REP. No. 609, supra note 15, at 504.
17. Id. at 504.
18. Id.
19. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 17.01[B][I].
20. LATMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 8.
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with its formalistic copyright requirements, was not one of the Conven-
tion's original members.
While the United States stubbornly refused to part ways with the
formalities of its copyright law, after the Second World War, Congress
recognized the importance of belonging to an international copyright
organization. To that end, Congress passed legislation in 1952 ratifying a
separate treaty-based organization: the Universal Copyright Convention
(UCC). The UCC was an alternative to the Berne Convention, created
under the "auspices of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO)"21 to "accommodate the peculiarities of
American copyright law, including the use of the familiar copyright
'(6)"'" and to provide a "simple avenue for protection on the basis of
national treatment, with few treaty requirements relating to the level of
protection."' However, the UCC was created with the full assistance of
the "founding members of the Berne Union," and there were safeguards
implemented to protect the Berne Treaty from "erosion by the lower level
UCC."24 Both the Berne Convention and the UCC are administered by
United Nations organizations; the former through the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO), and the latter through UNESCO.' The
UCC should not be perceived as a direct rival to Berne.' Its formation
came at a time when it was apparent that the entry of the "United States
... into the Berne Convention would require major amendments to
national copyright laws and, therefore, was not likely in the near fu-
ture. iM
Almost immediately following its passage, it soon became apparent
that the UCC was only a temporary solution. Starting in 1955, a parade of
experts suggested possible revisions in domestic law." These proposed
revisions were the subject of ongoing hearings and committee reports
starting in 196429 and reaching their high-water mark with the passage of
21. NIMMMR, supra note 11, § 17.01[B][2] (citing Act of Aug. 31, 1954, Pub. L. No.
83-743, 68 Stat. 1030 (1954)).
22. Ancel W. Lewis, Jr. et al., Recent Developments in Copyright Law: The Berne
Convention, 22 CoLo. LAW. 2525 (1993).
23. Id.
24. H.R. REP. No. 609, supra note 15, at 507-08.
25. Id. at 506-07.
26. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 17.01[B][2].
27. H.R. REp. No. 609, supra note 15, at 507.
28. LATMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 10.
29. Id. (providing a chronological examination of the legislative history of the 1976
Copyright Act).
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the Copyright Act of 1976 (1976 Act).3 The revisions contained in the
1976 Act affected numerous aspects of the existing American copyright
law, but contained two major modifications. First, federal law was
extended to unpublished works, where in the past, claimants had to seek
refuge under state copyright law." Second, the 1976 Act protected the
works provided they were properly marked at the time of their creation,
without compliance with a range of strict statutory formalities."
B. The Copyright Act of 1976 and the Berne Convention
Implementation Act
The 1976 Act has three relatively simple requirements for protection:
affixing of copyright notice on publicly distributed copies of works33 and
phonorecords,34 depositing of a certain number of these copies with the
Copyright Office,35 and registering with the Copyright Office.16 While
these claims continued to be a prerequisite for foreign authors and artists
to receive copyright protection, they were considerably more lenient than
in the past. The reason for this was probably a shift in the way the United
States viewed its role in the international community. Congress saw the
dangers and difficulties of failing to keep pace with the rest of the world
in the protection of intellectual property.37 The 1976 Act marked the
beginning of this shift.3
Another important part of the 1976 Act contained the provisions
addressing piratical copies. Section 501 of the 1976 Act prohibits the
importation of such copies or phonorecords into the United States. Section
602 of the Copyright Act creates two classes of such copies. The first class
covers those copies made under circumstances which would violate the
copyright law of the United States.' The Customs Service may deny entry
30. The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-803).
31. Lewis, supra note 22, at 2525.
32. Id.
33. 17 U.S.C. § 401 (1994).
34. 17 U.S.C. § 402 (1994).
35. 17 U.S.C. § 407 (1994).
36. 17 U.S.C. §§ 408-10 (1994).
37. LATMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 9-10.
38. Note the language of 17 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1994): "The works specified by section
102 and 103, while unpublished, are subject to protection under this title without regard to
nationality or domicile of the author." Id. "It can safely be stated that Congress drafted and
passed the 1976 act with a 'weather eye' on Berne." H.R. REP. No. 609, supra note 15,
at 516.
39. 17 U.S.C. §§ 501 and 602 (1994).
40. 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1994).
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of this class of copies into the United States.41 The second class includes
those copies made in accordance with the law of the nation in which the
reproduction takes place. Such copies cannot be denied entry into the
United States, although copyright infringement may still exist if the U.S.
distribution rights have not been secured.42
The United States finally joined the Berne Convention in 1986 after
the passage of the Berne Convention Implementation Act (BCIA).43
Although there were many reasons for finally acceding to the Convention,
three major motivations dominated. First, the UCC had long been regarded
as the second-rate multinational treaty organization, because its level of
minimum copyright protection was considerably less than that afforded by
the Berne Convention.' Congress believed that the Berne standards would
act as more effective deterrents against "piracy of American works."45
Second, the United States realized that its credibility in the formation of
"international copyright policy" was significantly weakened by its failure
to join the Berne Convention.' Former United States Trade Representa-
tive Clayton Yeutter wrote, "[I]t is often hard to convince other countries
to provide strong copyright protection when we do not belong to the
premier international treaty in the area of copyright."'47 Third, the costs
and burdens imposed on American companies using Berne's "backdoor"
provision denied protection to most artists and authors.' The "backdoor"
provision refers to Article 3(1) of the Berne Convention which extends
protection to authors from non-Berne countries if publication occurs
simultaneously in the author's nation, and in a nation belonging to the
Convention.49 However, the substantial expenses associated with using this
option made it only available to large U.S. corporations.50
Acceding to the Berne Convention has changed "U.S. copyright law
41. Id.
42. 17 U.S.C. § 602(b) (1994). For a thorough discussion of U.S. Customs procedure
regarding the importation of pirated copies, see Lawrence M. Friedman, Protection of
Intellectual Property Rights at the Border: Customs Law and Practice, 19 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 429 (1993).
43. Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853
(1988).
44. S. REP. No. 352, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-51 (1988), reprinted in PAUL
GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE 575-76 (Supp. 1994).
45. Id. at 575-76.
46. Id.
47. 134 CONG. REc. 10,323 (1988) (letter of former U.S. Trade Rep. Clayton Yeutter
included in statement of Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier).
48. S. REP. No. 352, supra note 44, at 577-78.
49. Berne Convention, supra note 1.
50. S. REP. No. 352, supra note 44, at 577-78.
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more than any other single event in its 200-year history."51 The notice
requirement was eliminated as a prerequisite to receiving copyright
protection. "At best, marking with a copyright notice only serves to nullify
a defense of innocent infringement."I Registration was no longer required
of foreign authors and artists belonging to the Berne Convention.'
Recordation of transfers of copyright ownership was dropped completely,
but the deposit requirement was retained.'
To summarize, the United States has traditionally taken a nationalistic
stance toward the development of copyright law, ostensibly to encourage
an American culture and its nascent publishing industry. This old attitude
changed, but not without substantial resistance in the halls of Congress.
The United States now produces the bulk of the world's copyrightable
materials. Indeed, it would be difficult to go to the four corners of the
world and not find a movie, book, or musical recording created by an
American. Congress realized the difficulties created by the failure to accede
to Berne and finally changed the existing copyright law to meet its
standards.
It is important to note that while the changes made under the BCIA
were significant, Congress only altered the 1976 Act enough to merely
comply with Berne. For example, the BCIA is not self-executing, meaning
that rights found in the copyright laws of other nations cannot merge into
the laws of the United States. 55 Also, the provisions of the BCIA are not
retroactive. Thus, works created before March 1, 1989, the effective date
of the BCIA, are still forced to meet the notice requirement.5 6
The goal of the United States' entry into the Berne Convention was
to strike a balance between national values and international harmony in the
intellectual property arena. American copyright law is "not primarily for
the benefit of the author, but primarily for the benefit of the public."'
The copyright loophole highlighted by Subafilms undermines these national
values by allowing American companies who sanction and profit from
overseas pirating to avoid the reach of U.S. copyright law. Ultimately, the
public loses the benefits provided by the law. It is this philosophy
underlying the BCIA that one must keep in mind when analyzing the
51. Lewis, supra note 22, at 2525.
52. Id. at 2526.
53. Id. The requirement was retained for U.S. authors, but only to gain access to
federal courts, not to receive copyright protection.
54. Id. At most, a failure to deposit a work will produce a request from the Copyright
Office to do so, and then a nominal fine for noncompliance.
55. Id.
56. H. REP. No. 609, supra note note 15, at 523.
57. Id. at 517.
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portions of Subafilms which address the role of the United States in the
international copyright community.
II. THIRD-PARTY LIABILITY FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
Liability for copyright infringement comes from the law of tort.
Accordingly, doctrines like contributory negligence and vicarious liability
have found copyright analogs." However, these doctrines have created
confusion when courts have sought to apply them. Before undertaking a
discussion of these doctrines, a definition of "direct infringement" is
necessary.
An act of infringement occurs when the rights afforded a copyright
holder under Section 106 of the Copyright Act have been violated. 9 The
owner of such a copyright has the exclusive right to copy' distribute,
publicly perform,6 or display the work,62 or to authorize any of these
acts.63 Therefore, it naturally follows that one who violates any or all of
these rights is a direct infringer.' However, through the inclusion of the
words "to authorize" in Section 106, Congress recognized the liability of
contributory infringers-those who have acted in concert with the direct
infringer and knew of the infringing activity.'
58. For a full discussion of these analogs, see NIMMER, supra note 11, § 12.04.
59. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1994). "Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner.., is an infringer of the copyright." Id.
60. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). Copies are defined under the Act as "material objects,
other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later
developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." Id.
61. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). "To perform" a work "publicly" means to "perform or
display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of
persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered," or
to "transmit" a performance to a place open to the public. Performance of an audiovisual
work means "to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it
audible." Id.
62. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). To "display" an audiovisual work means to "show
individual images nonsequentially." Id.
63. This notion of authorization will be discussed extensively in Part III of this
Note.
64. An infringer may escape liability using any of the exceptions found in 17 U.S.C.
§§ 106-118.
65. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1975), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674. "Use of the phrase 'to authorize' is intended to avoid any
questions as to the liability of contributory infringers." Id. The inclusion of "to authorize"
also is a recognition of the related doctrine of vicarious liability. NIMMER, supra note 11,
§ 12.04[A].
66. A. Samuel Oddi, Contributory Copyright Infringement: The Tort and Technology
Tensions, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 47 (1989).
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A. Vicarious Liability
An explanation of the contributory infringement doctrine must be
distinguished from the closely related doctrine of vicarious liability. While
neither doctrine is codified in the Copyright Act, the courts have long
recognized both doctrines,67 despite the fact that "the boundaries between
the two doctrines are often fluid." 6" Copyright infringement based on
vicarious liability arises out of the tort doctrine of respondeat superior.6 9
Thus, copyright infringement is found to exist when "the right and ability
to supervise coalesce with an obvious and direct financial interest in the
exploitation of copyright materials."'7 Furthermore," [o]ne need not have
knowledge that the direct infringer is engaged in infringing conduct to be
held vicariously liable."7" Note that this definition goes beyond the scope
of the traditional employer-employee relationship to encompass any
situation where a defendant may be liable for merely having control over
the primary infringer and has a direct financial interest in his activities.'
One example of vicarious liability is when a corporation who owns a
television or radio station is "held liable for the airing of an infringing
program [because] it had the power to supervise and control the content of
infringing programming."73 If the court determines that the parent
corporation did indeed have control, it is not necessary to prove the
corporation had knowledge that the radio station was airing infringing
shows. Another example is when the owner of a premises where infringing
works are being sold is liable for such sales because he has the right to
supervise the activity of the manager of the premises and has received rent
payments based upon the sale of the infringing activities.74 A final
67. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984).
68. Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 292 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). See also
NIMMER, supra note 11, § 12.04[A] n.12.
69. See NIMMER, supra note 11, § 12.04[A][1].
70. Shapiro, Bernstein, & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963).
71. Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1150, 1162
(2d Cir. 1971).
72. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 12.04[A][1]. See also Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State
Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n, Inc., 554 F.2d 1213 (1st Cir. 1977).
73. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 12.04[A]. See, e.g., Realsongs v. Gulf Brdcst. Corp.,
824 F. Supp. 89 (M.D.La. 1993); Schumann v. Albuquerque Corp., 664 F. Supp. 473
(D.N.M. 1987); Chappell & Co. v. Frankel, 285 F. Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Bevan
v. Columbia Brdcst. Sys., Inc., 329 F. Supp. 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); and National Ass'n of
Performing Artists v. Win. Penn Brdcst. Co., 38 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
74. This is an example of the so-called ballroom cases. See generally Buck v. Jewell-La
Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931); Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein
& Co., 36 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1929); Remick Music Corp. v. Interstate Hotel Co., 58 F.
Supp. 523 (D. Neb. 1944), aff'd, 157 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1946). Other examples related to
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example of vicarious infringement liability is if one directs the use of a




The doctrine of contributory infringement has its roots in the tort
theory of enterprise liability.76 The most commonly cited test for contribu-
tory infringement is provided by Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia
Artists Management, Inc. 7: "A defendant may be contributorily liable for
the infringing acts of another when 'with knowledge of the infringing
activity, [the defendant] induces, causes, or materially contributes to the
infringing conduct of another.""' Unlike vicarious infringers, those found
liable under a contributory theory must be shown to have some knowledge
of the infringing activity.
Because copyright infringement is a tort, the concepts of tort liability
are helpful in establishing the scope of the contributory infringement doc-
trine.79 The tort theory of enterprise liability is found in Section 876 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The Implied Concerted Conduct Rules
found in Section 876(b) require the contributing tortfeasor "[to know] that
the other's conduct [constitutes] a breach of duty and gives substantial
assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself."' The
conduct of the contributory tortfeasors is deemed implied if it can be
established that they had actual knowledge of the breach of duty committed
by the other."'
A closer examination of the two factors necessary to find contributory
infringement shows that the elements are interrelated. There exists a
the described scenario are cases involving record stores. See generally Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. Niro's Palace Inc., 619 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Chess Music, Inc. v. Sipe,
442 F. Supp. 1184 (D. Minn. 1978); KECA Music, Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F.
Supp. 72 (W.D. Mo. 1977). However, note that the "landlord of a premises where
infringing works [are] sold [is not] rendered an infringer simply by reason of such
relationship." NIMMER, supra note 11, § 12.04[A][1].
75. RCAIAriola Int'l, Inc., v. Thomas & Grayston Co., 845 F.2d 773, 781 (8th Cir.
1988).
76. Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); NIMMER,
supra note 11, at § 12.04[A][2].
77. Gershwin, 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971).
78. ITSI T.V. Prods., Inc. v. California Auth. of Racing Fairs, 785 F. Supp. 854, 861
(E.D. Cal. 1992) (quoting Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162).
79. Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, 256 F. Supp. 399, 403
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 876B (1979).
81. Id.
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directly proportional relationship between the actions of the contributory
and direct infringer; the closer the actions of the former are to the actions
of the latter, the stronger the inference that the contributory party knew of
the infringing act.' In the case where the actions of the contributory party
are relatively close to the actions of the direct infringer, the plaintiff may
present enough facts to suggest that a reasonable person would have known
that an act of infringement was occurring. Obviously, the more distant the
contributory act is from the direct act, the more difficult it becomes on the
part of the plaintiff to show through an inference that the contributory party
had knowledge. In these circumstances, a showing of actual knowledge
may be required.'
Cases employing the contributory infringement doctrine generally fall
into two broad categories. The first is where the personal participation of
the infringer is part of, or furthers, the infringement.' Generally
speaking, a person giving assistance or authorization may be held liable as
a contributory infringer if those actions bear a "direct relationship to the
infringing acts and that person was shown to be acting in concert with the
infringer."' Such cases of contributory infringement have a very
important application. They may be used to establish third-party liability
if the requirements of the vicarious liability cannot be met.'
The more difficult application of the contributory infringement
doctrine is of the "implied concert rule." This is used in cases where a
defendant has contributed machinery or goods that provide the means to
infringe.' Because there is a weaker nexus between the contributory and
direct infringer, it becomes difficult to prove knowledge of the underlying
act of infringement. However, in the landmark case of Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.88 the Supreme Court majority
stated that, "If. . . liability is to be imposed on Sony in this case, it must
rest on the fact that it sold equipment with constructive knowledge of the
fact that its customers may use that equipment to make unauthorized copies
82. Oddi, supra note 66, at 68.
83. Id. at 68-70.
84. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 12.04[A][2]. The Subafilms case falls into this category.
85. Id. § 12.04[A][2][a]. Examples of such cases are Universal City Studios v.
Nintendo Co., 615 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 797 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 987 (1986); Schuchart & Assocs., Professional Eng'rs., Inc. v. Solo
Serve Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928 (W.D. Tex. 1982); MacMilian Co. v. I.V.O.W. Corp., 495
F. Supp. 1134 (D. Vt. 1980); Gladys Music, Inc. v. Arch Music Co., 150 U.S.P.Q. 26
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
86. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 12.04[A][2][a]. See, e.g., Select Theatres Corp. v.
Ronzoni Macaroni Co., 59 U.S.P.Q. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
87. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 12.04[A][2][b].
88. Sony, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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of copyrighted material."' If liability in such instances can be based on
constructive knowledge, the Court has created an infringement standard that
exceeds the scope of the implied concert rule.'
In sum, the doctrines of vicarious and contributory infringement can
be used as a basis for third-party liability. Both are borrowed from the law
of tort. Vicarious liability has its origin in the doctrine of respondeat
superior, and contributory infringement has its origin in the theory of
enterprise liability. The main difference between the two doctrines is that
vicarious liability is premised on control and financial interest, whereas
contributory liability is premised on knowledge and participation. Both of
these doctrines support the needed changes to the Copyright Act which will
be discussed later.
III. CASES INVOLVING INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW
The final area that needs to be examined before we can begin an
analysis of Subafilms is the body of case law covering international
copyright disputes prior to that decision.9 Many of the cases involving
international copyright before 1976 centered on the cumbersome require-
ments of American copyright law and the impact on foreigners seeking its
protections.' However, a few pre-Berne decisions did deal with issues
apart from problems with American copyright formalities. A reading of
these decisions suggests that these courts were hesitant to apply the
Copyright Act to infringing activities taking place overseas.'
89. Id. at 439.
90. Oddi, supra note 66, at 71. Such a standard may create economic inefficiencies if
the potential liability it creates stymies the development of new materials and equipment.
Id.
91. In one of the earliest cases in this area, the Supreme Court upheld the common-law
performing rights of an English playwright, whose play was never published or printed,
against an American who copied it and had it copyrighted. Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S.
424 (1912). The case recognized the rights of foreign authors against acts of infringement
occurring in the U.S. This affirmed their ability to use American copyright law in such
instances.
92. See, e.g., Hoffenberg v. Kamenstein, 396 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 913 (1968); Heim v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 154 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1946);
Basevi v. O'Toole Co., 26 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
93. In Beechwood Music Corp. v. Veejay Records, the court denied the plaintiff the
protection of the Copyright Act's compulsory license clause because the act of infringement,
unauthorized reproduction of record albums, took place overseas. Beechwood, 328 F.2d 728
(2d Cir. 1964).
This is in stark contrast to the reading given the Lanham Trademark Act in Steele v.
Bulova Watch Co., which directly addressed the issue of extraterritorial application of
American law-Subafi/ms core issue. Steele, 194 F.2d 567 (1952), 4f'd, 344 U.S. 280
(1952). The Bulova Watch Company filed suit in a Texas court to enjoin an American
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After the BCIA was passed, the debate over the Copyright Act's
territorial limits continued. For example, the Copyright Act may be
considered inoperative with regard to an infringement activity transpiring
outside of the United States. Some argue that American courts may still
have jurisdiction in such instances if the plaintiff has a cause of action
arising under foreign copyright law, and personal jurisdiction can be
obtained over the defendant.94 In accordance with this logic, "the
transitory nature of a foreign copyright infringement action"' has been
recognized by an American court.96
A qualification to the maxim that the Copyright Act cannot be applied
extraterritorially occurs when a portion of the act of infringement takes
place in the United States and then is completed in another nation. In this
citizen living in Mexico from using its registered trademark on timepieces he was
manufacturing there. The District Court denied the plaintiff relief, but the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court sustained the decision. Steele, 344
U.S. at 289. The Supreme Court recognized that the copyright and trademark laws of the
United States do not have extraterritorial application but recognized that, "Congress in
prescribing standards of conduct for American citizens may project the impact of its laws
beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States." Id. at 282. The Court further noted
that "the United States [was] not debarred by any rule of international law from governing
the conduct of its own citizens . . . in foreign countries when the rights of other nations.
are not infringed." Id. at 285-86 (quoting Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1941)).
94. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 17.03. However, patent and trademark courts are divided
over exercising jurisdiction in actions for infringement arising under foreign laws. This
may be because of the procedural and administrative formalities present in such actions. The
obstacles presented by these requirements are argued not to be found in foreign copyright
laws. It follows that U.S. courts will be placed in the unenviable role of having "to pass
upon the validity of administrative acts undertaken by foreign government officials." 1d.
95. Id.
96. In London Film Prods. Ltd. v. Int'l Comm., a British corporation brought suit in
New York against an American corporation for the latter's infringement of British copyright
for causing three of the plaintiff's motion pictures to be shown in Chile. London, 580 F.
Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction, while making several important statements regarding the use of foreign
copyright law in reaching its holding. Id. at 48. First, the court supported the theory that
the copyright infringement is a transitory tort and "hence may be adjudicated in the courts
of a sovereign other than the one in which the cause of action arose." Id. at 48-9. Second,
the court distinguished the instant case from others where "a 'crucial issue' as to the
validity of [foreign] . . .law was present." Id. at 49. In support of this premise, the court
noted that Great Britain and Chile belonged to the Berne Convention, and, therefore, there
were no complex requirements to receive copyright protection for films made in either
nation. Id. Finally, the court noted that it had "an obvious interest in securing compliance
with this nation's laws by citizens of foreign nations who have dealings with this
jurisdiction." Id.
The court further noted that "[a]n unwillingness by this Court to hear a complaint
against its own citizens with regard to foreign law will engender. . . a similar unwilling-
ness on the part of a foreign jurisdiction when the question arises concerning a violation of
our laws by one of its citizens . . . ." Id.
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situation the parties who contributed to the act may be found liable as
contributory infringers. Obviously, the question at the core of these cases
is to what extent must a defendant contribute to an act of infringement in
the United States in order to be found liable as a third-party infringer.'
Two cases from the 1980s addressed the issue of third-party liability
for infringing activities which took place overseas. Both suggested that a
domestic authorization for an infringing activity which took place overseas
was sufficient to give a U.S. District Court subject matter jurisdiction. In
Thomas v. Pansy Ellen Products,9 8 the court allowed recovery when the
agent of the domestic defendant working in the United States authorized a
Taiwanese manufacturer to reproduce the plaintiff's copyrighted design.99
The Thomas decision was based on another case supporting a similar
reading of "to authorize," Peter Starr Production Co. v. Twin Continental
Films, Inc.,"o which was overturned by Subafilms.
In Peter Starr, the plaintiff complained that Twin, the defendant,
infringed the plaintiff Starr's copyright by authorizing another to exhibit a
motion picture without Starr's consent. 101 The Ninth Circuit found that
"an infringer is not merely one who uses a work without authorization by
the copyright owner, but also one who authorizes the use of a copyrighted
work without actual authority from the copyright owner." 1° The court
held that the defendant was liable as a contributory infringer for authoriz-
ing, via a contract executed in the United States, the acts of infringement
97. For example, in Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v. O'Reilly, the plaintiffs tried to avail
themselves of the U.S. Copyright Act by arguing that the defendant American acting troupe
rehearsed for its Canadian performances in the United States, and these rehearsals were an
integral part of the subsequent infringing activity-performing a copyrighted play for which
the performance rights had not been obtained. Stigwood, 530 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 848 (1976). The Second Circuit rejected the plaintiff's theory stating
.only when the defendants' domestic acts permit further reproduction abroad does the
work's [subsequent] exploitation abroad become a constructive trust." Id. at 1101. Funds
from this trust were then used to compensate the plaintiffs' damages. Id.
The Second Circuit preserved this exception to the presumption against extraterritorial
application in a case involving the copying and distribution of an American poster by an
Israeli newspaper. The test was met because the poster was duplicated in the United States,
and such an act allowed for further infringement abroad. Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin
Publishing, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1988).
98. Thomas, 672 F. Supp. 237 (W.D.N.C. 1987).
99. Id.
100. Peter Starr, 783 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986), overruled by Subafilms, Ltd. v.
MGM-Pathe Comm. Co., 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 512
(1994).
101. Peter Starr, 783 F.2d at 1442.
102. Id. at 1443 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417 (1984)).
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which took place overseas."0 3 An examination of these two cases suggests
that the reading given the "to authorize" clause by the courts in Thomas
and Peter Starr means such an authorization can be an integral part of the
extraterritorial infringement, and/or something that permits further
infringement abroad. "
This reading of "to authorize" was rejected in Danjaq, S.A. v.
MGM/UA Communications Co.1 5 The court, using the Gershwin'"
definition of contributory infringement, stressed that contributory
infringement could not be found without a finding of direct infringe-
ment."0 Without a finding of direct infringement, the authorization could
not be considered a contributory act, and therefore, the plaintiff's claim
based on the defendant's authorization was dismissed.108 It must be noted,
however, that this case dealt with an authorization that had never
culminated in an actual act of infringement. 1" Also, the court in Danjaq
never explicitly overturned Peter Starr, rather it narrowly construed the
holding as applying only to the question of "subject matter jurisdiction and
not to the sufficiency of the claim." 110 The court further concluded "it
would be too facile ... to conclude from [Peter Starr] that the Ninth
Circuit approved of the imposition of liability in the circumstances
described [that is, liability based on authorization of noninfringing
activity]."" One year after Danjaq, just such a conclusion was reached
by another California court in ITSI TV Productions, Inc. v. California
Authority of Racing Fairs."2 In 1TSI TV, the plaintiff company special-
izing in the closed circuit broadcasts of horse races alleged that one of the
defendants, Hipodromo de Agua Caliente (Caliente), was liable as a
contributory infringer. The company's complaint urged that Caliente had
constructive knowledge that their American contacts were committing
infringing activities by authorizing the extraterritorial broadcasts of the
plaintiff's horse racing shows."' The plaintiff's claim against defendant
Caliente was rather strained and was eventually dismissed for lack of
103. Id. at 1443.
104. In fact, these decisions go so far as to suggest that the authorization of the
infringing act was a separate, direct act of infringement. Id.; Thomas, 672 F. Supp. at 241.
105. Danjaq, 773 F. Supp. 194 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
106. Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt. Inc., 443 F.2d 1159 (2d
Cir. 1971).
107. Danjaq, 773 F. Supp. at 201.
108. Id. at 201-04.
109. Id. at 202.
110. Id. at 203.
111. Id.
112. ITSI T.V., 785 F. Supp. 854 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
113. Id. at 857.
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subject matter jurisdiction." 4 However, in reaching its decision the court
rejected much of the Danjaq opinion."'
The court began its analysis by finding that the "jurisdictional and
substantive issues are so intertwined that the question of jurisdiction is
dependent on the resolution of factual issues going to the merits."" 6 That
is, because the plaintiff's complaint alleged that the defendant authorized
infringing acts which took place outside of the United States, the court had
to determine if it had subject matter jurisdiction over such a claim under
the Copyright Act." 7 Such a determination cannot be made without
resolving the factual issues going to the merits of the case."' The court
went on to make more important findings.
First, it stated that the act of an "authorization" could be actionable
as a direct act of copyright infringement."' Second, the court concluded
that whether "the act 'authorized' occurs abroad is irrelevant to the
question whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction over a claim.
..." 2 Third, the court expanded the scope of the Copyright Act by
stating that "it is possible for a defendant to commit acts outside the United
States sufficient to find it contributorily or vicariously liable for acts of
infringement committed by others within the United States,"' even
though the court may not have personal jurisdiction over that defendant.
Finally, the court found no clear authority to exercise subject matter
jurisdiction over an action based on the infringement of a foreign copyright
law. 1'
IV. SUBFLvs
"U.S. Copyright Law Isn't Effective Abroad," trumpeted the National
Law Journal" after the Ninth Circuit handed down its decision in
Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co.24 Although the
National Law Journal overstated the court's conclusion in Subafilms, the
decision will have a major impact on the future victims of overseas
infringement. The facts of this case extend back to 1966 when the Beatles
114. Id. at 864.
115. Id. at 863.
116. Id. at 858 (citing Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983)).
117. 1TSI T.V., 785 F. Supp. at 858.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 860.
120. Id. at 863.
121. Id. at 864.
122. Id.
123. U.S. Copyright Law Isn't Effective Abroad, NAT'L L.J., May 30, 1994, at B4.
124. Subafilms, 24 F.3d 1088, (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 512 (1994).
Number 1]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
entered into an agreement with the plaintiffs to produce an animated motion
picture based upon their song "Yellow Submarine."'" The film was
released in theatres two years later and received a rather tepid reaction
from filmgoers.' 2 United Artists Corporation (UA) owned the rights to
the film from its initial distribution and into the home video market in the
early 1980s. At that time UA began to enter several licensing agreements
to distribute some of the films in its catalog on videocassette."2 The film,
Yellow Submarine,28 was never released by UA because of uncertainty
over whether it had the actual home video rights to the project. Before that
determination could be made, UA was acquired by MGM, and the
successor company that was created, MGM/UA Communications Co.,
authorized video distribution of the film. American distribution was
handled through MGM/UA's home video subsidiary; foreign distribution
was completed through Warner Home Video. 129
In 1988, the producer of Yellow Submarine, Subafilms, brought suit
against MGM/UA, Warner, and their respective subsidiaries alleging that
the videocassette distribution constituted copyright infringement. The case
was tried before a special master who found for Subafilms and awarded
$2.2 million in compensatory damages. 30 A panel of the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the District Court's judgment in an unpublished disposition. The
panel concluded it was bound by the Peter Starr decision with respect to
foreign distribution of the picture.'3 '
The appellants, MGM/UA, then requested a rehearing en bane in
light of the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v.
Nintendo of America, Inc. 3' In that case, the court concluded that there
could be no liability for authorizing a party to engage in an infringing act
when the authorized party's "use would not violate the Copyright
Act."3 While this case did not involve extraterritorial infringement, it
was highly relevant to the questions posed in Subafilms.
The Ninth Circuit wasted no time in attacking the holding of Peter
Starr The court in Subafilms cited copyright professor Melville Nimmer,
when he noted "to the extent that an activity does not violate one of th[e]
125. THE BEATLES, YELLOW SUBMARINE (Capitol Records 1966).
126. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1089.
127. Id.
128. YELLOW SUBMARINE (United Artists 1968).
129. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1089.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Lewis Galoob, 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1582 (1993);
Subafilns, 24 F.3d at 1090.
133. Lewis Galoob, 964 F.2d at 970.
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five enumerated rights [contained in 17 U.S.C. § 106], authorizing such
activity does not constitute copyright infringement. " " The court then
rejected the idea that the words "to authorize" added in the 1976 Copyright
Act were meant to "create a new form of liability."' 35 This is in line with
Professor Nimmer's belief that such an interpretation would be imprudent
because "[i]n all but exceptional circumstances, the act of authorization
simpliciter is unlikely to damage the copyright owner."13 6 The court then
concluded its analysis of contributory infringement by citing cases that
support the maxim that "there can be no liability for contributory
infringement unless the authorized or otherwise encouraged activity could
amount to infringement." 37
The Subafilms court stated that an authorization could not stand alone
as a direct act of infringement; it can only be the basis for a claim of
contributory infringement. In turn, a claim of contributory infringement
needs an accompanying act of direct infringement to sustain it. Accord-
ingly, the court focused on whether such an act of direct infringement took
place. This brought them in direct conflict with the Peter Starr decision.
The court cited Nimmer:
Given the undisputed axiom that United States copyright law has
no extraterritorial application, it would seem to necessarily
follow that a primary activity outside the boundaries of the
United States ... cannot serve as the basis for holding liable
under the Copyright Act one who is merely related to that
activity within the United States.138
In sum, the court then employed this logic in forming the central holding
of the opinion: An authorization can only form the basis for a claim of
contributory infringement. Contributory infringement requires a direct act
of infringement. A direct act of infringement cannot occur if none of the
provisions of Section 106 of the Copyright Act is violated. The Copyright
Act cannot be violated if the infringing act takes place in a foreign jurisdic-
tion. Therefore, one cannot be held liable for authorizing acts of infringe-
ment that occur overseas. 139
The decision in Subafilms clearly shows that future plaintiffs have few
legal options they can use to protect themselves from deliberate infringe-
ments of their rights in overseas markets. There are two less attractive
possible avenues for relief. The first is the Update Art doctrine which
134. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1093 (quoting NiMMER, supra note 11, § 12.04[A][3][a]).
135. Id.
136. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 12.04[A][3][a].
137. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1093.
138. Id. (quoting NMMER, supra note 11, § 12.04[A][3][b]).
139. Id. at 1094.
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allows for extraterritorial copyright application "when the type of
infringement permits further reproduction abroad."" 4 However, the
Second Circuit has not applied this exception to a case where the
"infringement" is an authorization.1 41 It appears as though an authoriza-
tion would not meet this standard in the Ninth Circuit. The Update Art'42
decision, in the words of the Subafilms court, "is premised on the theory
that the copyright holder may recover damages that stem from a direct
infringement of its exclusive rights [under Section 106] that occur[s] within
the United States." 43 The Ninth Circuit does not treat an authorization
as a direct act. Therefore, only some other type of direct infringement
could be used as a basis for liability.
The other option future plaintiffs may have, which is supported by
Professor Nimmer, 44 is to use the court systems of the countries where
the infringement occurred, or ask the U.S. courts to apply foreign
copyright law. However, there are several problems with this option. In an
often-cited law review note, David R. Toraya points out that the basic
principle of national copyright law is "that a copyright can be infringed and
thus exists only within the sovereign state whose law created it. Conse-
quently th[at] foreign state . . .maintains its interest in interpreting and
applying its own copyright law." 45 There are several factors to consider
when using a foreign law, notwithstanding whether that nation's "intellec-
tual property right requires administrative formalities." " One consider-
ation is the potential financial burden U.S. plaintiffs would face "preserv-
ing the foreign country's sovereignty interest." 47 Remember one of the
main reasons the United States finally joined Berne was to reduce the
expenditures associated with using Berne's "back door" protections.141
Forcing a plaintiff to use foreign law by denying a claim based on third-
party infringement reestablishes these same financial burdens and
inconveniences.
Although the Subafilms decision creates several problems, the court's
dispensation of the core issue was, for the most part, sound. To find the
140. 1d. (quoting Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publishing, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67, 73 (2d Cir.
1988)).
141. Id.
142. Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publishing, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1988).
143. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1094.
144. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 17.03.
145. David R. Toraya, Note, Federal Jurisdiction over Foreign Copyright Actions: An
Unsolicited Reply to Professor Nimmer, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 1165, 1193 (1985).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1192.
148. Id.
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defendants liable on the basis of their authorization would have required the
court to overcome the presumption against extraterritorial application of
American laws, in the absence of a clear legislative intent. 149 The court
correctly noted that in the cases where this presumption was overcome, a
statute gave Congress broad remedial powers, usually based on the
Commerce Clause.15 Absent such a statute, the court can do little to
overcome the presumption. The court in Subafilms correctly refused to
extend the limits of U.S. copyright law by judicial fiat and deferred to the
legislative branch to create a solution.
The major flaw in the opinion is the court's misplaced concern that
expanding the reach of the Copyright Act would in some way interfere with
international copyright relations. Another controversial conclusion of the
court is its outright denial that an authorization can be treated as a direct
act of infringement.' However, addressing this question would exceed
the scope of this Note."m Here an authorization will only be discussed as
a basis for contributory/vicarious liability; it will not be addressed as a
potential direct act of infringement.
149. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1095 (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,
248 (1991)). TheArabianAm. Oil decision denied extraterritorial application of a provision
contained in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
150. Id. at 1096. The examples used by the court are the Lanham Trademark Act, the
Sherman Antitrust Act, and other securities laws.
151. Id. at 1092. "[T'he addition of the words 'to authorize' in the Copyright Act was
not meant to create a new form of liability for 'authorization' that was divorced completely
from the legal consequences of authorized conduct - ... " Id. The court felt it was
necessary to state explicitly that an authorization could not be a direct infringement, thus
denying any possible alternative avenue of relief for the plaintiff. If it had recognized the
authorization as a direct act, the plaintiffs could have amended their complaint and started
over. Nothing in the court's opinion, however, provides a satisfactory explanation for why
an authorization is not a direct act of infringement, nor for that matter why Congress
included the words "to authorize" in the 1976 Copyright Act. H.R. RPp. No. 1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674; NIMMER, supra
note 11, § 12.04[A][3][a]. ITSI T.V. Prods., Inc. v. California Auth. of Racing Fairs
supported the idea that "Congress created a new form of 'direct' infringement when it
amended the Act to include the words 'to authorize'." ITSI T.V., 785 F. Supp. 854, 860.
(E.D. Cal. 1992). It is difficult to view the mere act of an authorization as a direct act of
infringement. An authorization is merely a consent or an order, and as soon as it is
accompanied by an act of direct infringement, it must be analyzed in conjunction with that
act of infringement. If the direct act is not violative of a copyright holder's § 106 rights,
then obviously the "authorizer" cannot be a contributory infringer. Id.
152. There is much confusion about the inclusion of "to authorize." It is not disputed
that a copyright holder secures the right to engage in any of the specified acts mentioned
in § 106, and if anyone else engages in those acts without the permission of the copyright
holder, that person is a direct infringer. However, the statute explicitly provides the
copyright holder with the right "to authorize" any § 106 act. Why then does an
authorization by someone other than the copyright holder not constitute copyright
infringement unless it is also accompanied by an unauthorized action of a § 106 right?
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V. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT
Nimmer's ideas on extraterritorial application of the Copyright Act
heavily influenced the Subafilms decision. Clearly, Nimmer rejects the idea
that liability can befall a defendant who has authorized an act of infringe-
ment occurring abroad.'53 This conclusion is drawn from two hypothe-
ticals mentioned in Nimmer's treatise, where individuals authorize an
activity that would constitute infringement in their own country, but not in
the country where the activity is to be carried out.'" Nimmer concludes
that such individuals cannot be held liable for a violation of U.S. copyright
law. However, if the authorization takes place in a foreign jurisdiction and
the infringing act takes place in the United States, the infringer can be
found liable under American copyright law.'"5 It should be noted that
Nimmer's hypotheticals conspicuously avoid situations where the infringing
act would violate foreign law. This is because in these situations, Nimmer
would encourage the use of the foreign statute by a U.S. court, under the
assumption that infringement is a transitory tort. As mentioned earlier,
there are drawbacks to this suggested course of action.'56
Ninmer developed three hypotheticals in support of his rejection of
extraterritorial copyright application based on domestic authorization. The
first of these invites closer examination. Nimmer outlined a scenario where
an individual in New York authorizes public display of a copyrighted work
of art in Canada, where the right of public display is not recognized. He
avers that it would be "perverse to construe Congress's intention as holding
liable a person who authorizes an activity abroad that is perfectly legal
abroad." 7 Such a conclusion is overly simplistic. For example, copying
American-made videotapes, books, and software may be "legal" in some
countries because no bilateral agreements exist with them, nor do those
nations belong to the UCC or the Berne Convention.' 8 Recall that under
Section 602(b) of the Copyright Act,' 59 if these items are copied in South
Korea without the consent of the American copyright holder, their importa-
tion can be prohibited by the Customs Service. Congress obviously was
concerned about the impact of such piratical copies on the American
153. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1095 (citing NIMMER, supra note 11, § 12.04[A][3l[b]).
154. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 12.04[A][3][b].
155. Id.
156. See supra note 144.
157. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 12.04[A][3][b].
158. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 104 (1994) (providing, in notes, a table of bilateral
treaties).
159. 17 U.S.C. § 602(b) (1988).
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economy. So, are we to assume that Congress is not concerned if an
American company authorizes infringement to take place in that country
and directly profits from it?
The following five plausible arguments could be advanced against
such an extension of the Copyright Act.
A. The United States Does Not Have a Significant Interest in
Allowing the Copyright Act to Extend to Acts of Infringement
Occurring Overseas.
Losses to U.S. copyright holders due to foreign infringement were
estimated to be $6.2 billion in 1986, up from $1.5 billion only four years
before. 6° It is inconceivable that Congress would intentionally provide
immunity for American companies who contribute to this problem by
authorizing infringement activities abroad and then profiting from them. An
"authorization" can serve as a link to corporations who may contribute to
the problem by their infringing actions in the United States. Finding these
corporations liable on third-party liability theories would give aggrieved
parties another avenue for relief.
B. Plaintiffs in Future Actions Have Several Potential Remedies
Available, and, Therefore, It Is Not Necessary to Create a
New One.
The Subafilms court suggests the existence of other possible remedies
for the plaintiffs, such as breach of contract or bringing suit under the
copyright laws of another nation.1 61 Of course, breach of contract is only
available if a contract exists between the authorizer and the aggrieved third
party. In the scenario presented above, where one authorizes reproduction
of a copyrighted videocassette in South Korea, this remedy obviously could
not apply because no contract exists.
Similarly, in such a situation the victim of the infringement could not
take advantage of South Korea's copyright law because one does not exist.
Even if South Korea had a copyright law, use of that law would involve
considerable additional expense, making it a less palatable alternative. 62
Simply because the activity took place in a Berne nation does not mean that
nation has a copyright law and system of civil procedure identical or even
similar to that of the United States. Also, if infringing activity were spread
160. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PuB. No. 2065, FOREIGN PROTECTION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EFFECT ON U.S. INDUSTRY AND TRADE §§ 4-6
to -8 (1988).
161. Subafimns, 24 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 512 (1994).
162. See supra note 144.
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out over several countries, the plaintiff would have to satisfy the legal
standards of copyright infringement of several different nations-a most
onerous burden.163
C. Such an Extension Would Disrupt the Pending GAIT
Agreement.
In extensive dicta, the Ninth Circuit expresses concern over how an
extraterritorial application of the Copyright Act in a situation like the one
in Subafilms would somehow disrupt "Congress's efforts to secure a more
stable international environment." 64 The court marches out its "parade
of horribles" pointing out how such an extension "contravenes the spirit of
Berne." An extension would weaken the credibility of the U.S. in trade
negotiations and would create a choice of law problem. The court never
explains just how this will occur. If the appellants in Subafilms had been
found liable as contributory infringers for their authorization of the
overseas infringement, they would have been in violation of the U.S.
Copyright Act. That is, an American defendant corporation would have
been in violation of an American law. How could this be found to affect
the "delicate field of international relations"?
Perhaps what actually concerns the court is how such an extension
would affect Congress's attempts "to secure a multilateral regime of
intellectual property protection."165 The court then makes reference to the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods (TRIPS or TRIPS Agree-
ment)I6 -the compromise reached by participating nations concerning
intellectual property protection under the revised GATT-as an example of
such a multilateral regime. 67 The TRIPS Agreement will certainly be a
powerful weapon against foreign piracy, but it is not a panacea and needs
to be supplemented by extending the reach of the Copyright Act.
163. See High Court Torpedoes "Yellow Submarine," OREGONIAN (Portland), Nov. 15,
1994, at B12.
164. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1097-98.
165. Id.
166. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, reprinted in
33 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1197 (1994).
167. This agreement calls for the "National Treatment" standard, found in the Berne
Convention, to be adopted by all nations signing the agreement. TRIPS articulates standards
covering the availability, scope, and use of all forms of intellectual property. All signing
nations must comply with the copyright provisions of Berne. TRIPS does increase the
protection for performers, producers of sound recordings, and broadcasting organizations
over that which they normally received under Berne. Id.
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D. The Pending TRIPS Agreement Obliterates the Need for
Extension of the U.S. Copyright Act.
The TRIPS Agreement will provide for the minimum standards of the
Berne Convention, but note that the dispute in Subafilms involved an
infringing act which took place in countries acceding to the Convention.
Simply because each country provides the same minimum standards does
not mean each nation's copyright law must be exactly alike. The Berne
Convention recognized that each nation tailored its copyright law to meet
the needs of its economy. The United States certainly has an interest in
enforcing its copyright law against violations committed by its citizens or
corporations located within its borders. Providing a basis for liability
through an authorization taking place in the United States does not interfere
with the interest of other nations because neither their citizens nor their
laws are involved.'68 Remember, while the act of infringement may have
occurred overseas, the proposed changes focus on U.S. defendants, not
non-U.S. defendants. While TRIPS may serve to bring the conduct of the
international intellectual property community up to a certain level, it is still
the duty of the United States to govern the conduct of its citizens.
E. An Extension of the U.S. Copyright Act Would Allow One to
Be Liable for an Act of Contributory Infringement Without an
Accompanying Act of Pimary Infringement.
It is up to the Congress of the United States to define "infringement."
The reason such liability has been denied in the past is because an overseas
act of infringement was not recognizable under the Copyright Act.
Amending the Act would change this and make such an overseas act of
infringement recognizable. Note the situation where third-party involvement
is not actionable because the primary act was never carried out. Finding
liability based on an authorization assumes that an authorization is a
separate and direct act of infringement. In Subafilms, the primary act of
infringement was not recognized merely because it transpired abroad, but
because it never occurred.
In sum, extending liability to third-party infringers for authorizations
taking place in the United States is one effective way to provide protection
against overseas infringement. The Ninth Circuit wisely left it to Congress
168. A foreign corporation might be affected, for example, if it contracted with an
American company to distribute a videocassette, and the foreign corporation discovered that
the American corporation never had the right to authorize distribution. The foreign
corporation can sue on the contract, using either the laws of its home nation or those of the
United States.
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to extend the Copyright Act in such a manner, but the court may have gone
too far in expressing its concern that such an extension would interfere with
U.S. participation in TRIPS. Such an extension of the Copyright Act would
be an effective way to supplement TRIPS and is fully within the United
States's interests in protecting its industry and governing the conduct of
citizens.
American copyright law before the Berne Convention had a decidedly
nationalistic focus that hampered the ability of the United States to shape
multinational agreements for the protection of intellectual property rights.
Extending the reach of the Copyright Act should not be perceived as a
return to the pre-Berne days of isolationist policy. Rather, it is simply a
way to bolster the protection against overseas piracy and infringement in
conjunction with TRIPS. The Agreement is well within the spirit of Berne,
because it allows American plaintiffs the option of using American courts,
rather than facing the cost and complexity of foreign courts. Finally, the
proposed extension is certainly not radical; it fits easily into the well-
developed doctrines of contributory and vicarious liability.
VI. SOLUTIONS
The solution to overseas piracy is intimated by the Subafilms court
and Nimmer, when both point to the patent law case of Deepsouth Packing
Co. v. Laitram Corp.169 The Supreme Court stated that a manufacturer
who produced components of a combination patent and then shipped them
abroad for reassembly was not liable as a direct or contributory in-
fringer. 7 ' The core of the Court's holding was that assembly in another
country of the several components of a combination patent was not
infringement because it took place overseas, out of the reach of U.S. patent
law. 171 Congress recognized the loophole created by the decision and
acted to close it. The language of the 1984 amendment makes it a violation
of the Patent Act when one "without authority supplies ... all or a
substantial portion of the components of a patented invention ... in such
a manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside
the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if the
combination occurred within the United States." 172
169. Deepsouth Packing, 406 U.S. 518 (1972). See Subafilms, 24 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th
Cir. 1994); NIMMER, supra note 11, § 12.04[A][b].
170. Deepsouth Packing, 406 U.S. at 519.
171. Id. at 524-32.
172. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (1988); NIMMER, supra note 11, § 12.04[A][3][b] n.98. See
also Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 657-58 (1834); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal,
286 U.S. 123, 131 (1932); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417,
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The kinship between patent law and copyright law can be traced to the
fact that both spring from the same section of the Constitution." Like
contributory infringement in the copyright sphere, patent contributory
infringement requires a direct act of infringement to provide a basis for the
claim. Also, lack of intent is not a defense to a claim of contributory patent
infringement.174 The biggest difference in the two doctrines is that
contributory patent infringement is provided by statute, while the courts'
contributory copyright infringement has very uncertain boundaries and
limits. 175
The Update Art76 standard is very similar to the language of the
Patent Act amendment. The amendment deals with a situation where the
shipment of components would permit reproduction of the patented product
abroad. Similarly, the Second Circuit held in Update Art that the presump-
tion against extraterritorial application can be overcome if the type of
infringement permits further reproduction abroad. 1 The example of such
infringement mentioned by the court is the "unauthorized manufacture of
copyrighted material in the United States."178 This language can serve as
the core for an amendment to the Copyright Act. However, it needs to be
expanded to include all types of infringement that may take place overseas,
not just reproductions. To this end, the following amendments are
suggested.
Congress should add to the Copyright Act the following language at
Section 501179 after the words "as the case may be." Thus, the Section
should read: "Liability for infringement may either be direct or contribu-
tory or vicarious as defined in Section 501(a)(1) and (2)." Then, add the
following language at Section 501(a)(1): 1'
Anyone who, with knowledge of an infringing activity, induces,
causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of
another, may be held liable as a contributory infringer, where
'infringement' is defined as a violation of the exclusive rights
438 (1984) (citing United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 157-58 (1948)).
For a good discussion of the difference in the two types of intellectual property, see Mazor
v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954).
173. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
174. Alfred P. Ewert et al., Will the New Information Superhighway Create 'Super'
Problems for Software Engineers? Contributory Infringement of Patented or Copyrighted
Software Applications, 4 ALB. L.J. ScI. TECH. 155, 182 (1994).
175. Id. at 183.
176. Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publishing, 843 F.2d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1988).
177. Id. at 71.
178. Id.
179. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1994).
180. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a)(1) (1994).
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afforded the copyright holder by Sections 106 through 118 of this
Chapter. This may include anyone providing a copyrighted work
to another with the knowledge that it will be reproduced in
violation of the right provided the holder of the copyright by
Section 106(1), or anyone who provides another with a copy-
righted work, and the means to produce an infringing copy of
that work, and who knows or should know that the other person
will make infringing copies of the copyrighted work, or anyone
providing an infringer with technology not capable of a substan-
tial noninfringing use.
This is language embracing the general view of contributory liability
where the defendant is "participating" in the infringement as opposed to
providing a means to infringe. Additional language may also be included
to bring the theory up to date with the Supreme Court's decision in Sony
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,' and to allow for
contrib- utory infringers to be found liable for providing the means to
infringe.
Next, add the following language at Section 501(a)(2):In
One who has an agency or partnership relationship with an
infringer, or in the absence of such a special relationship, has the
right and ability to supervise infringing activity and has a direct
financial interest in such an activity, may be held liable as a
vicarious infringer, where infringement is defined as a violation
of the exclusive rights afforded the copyright holder by Sections
106 through 118 of this Chapter.
These two sections are merely recitations of doctrines formulated by the
courts, but it is important that both are enumerated to avoid the seemingly
inevitable confusion and overlap that exists between them.
The following language needs to be added to explain the use of the
words "to authorize" at Section 501(a)(3):' 83 "An authorization which
violates the exclusive rights of the copyright holder as provided by Sections
106 through 118 may be the basis for a finding of contributory infringe-
ment, if that authorization induces, causes, or materially contributes to the
infringing activity of another."" The first sentence allows a defendant
to be found guilty of contributory infringement on the basis of constructive
knowledge; that is, the contributory infringer can be found liable on the
theory that he should have known his authorization would lead to an
181. Sony, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
182. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a)(2) (1994)
183. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a)(3) (1994).
184. The following language could be added if an authorization were to be treated as a
direct infringement: "Such an authorization may also be the basis for a finding of direct
liability if it is given with the knowledge that it would accomplish an infringing activity,
regardless of whether such infringing activity is fully or partially completed."
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infringement.
The final revision would provide limited extraterritorial application of
the Copyright Act in certain situations. This language could be placed in
a new subsection, "(f)," of Section 501 and would read:
(1) One who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces,
causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of
another, may be held liable as a contributory infringer, even
though the infringing activity was carried out in a foreign
jurisdiction, provided such contributory infringement took place
within the boundaries of the United States, or was performed by
a citizen of the United States living in a foreign jurisdiction, or
by a corporation chartered in the United States over which
personal jurisdiction can be exercised.
(2) An authorization may be considered an act of contributory
infringe ment, even if the primary infringing activity were
carried out in a foreign jurisdiction, provided that such authoriza-
tion induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing
activity of another.
(3) An authorization may be considered an act of vicarious
infringement even if the primary infringing activity were carried
out in a foreign jurisdiction, provided that such authorization has
been given by an individual or corporation with the right and
ability to supervise infringing activity, and has a direct financial
interest in such an activity.
In sum, these suggested changes will finally provide statutory
recognition of the theories of contributory and vicarious infringement and
will allow extraterritorial application of the Copyright Act in special
circumstances. The changes will give future plaintiffs the option of
pursuing either a theory of contributory or vicarious infringement,
depending on the facts of the instant case.
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